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This Note analyzes the legislative history and case law construing the applicable statutes to
determine if a court could extend these statutes to cover indirect involvement of United States
citizens and resident aliens in international terrorist acts. The Note will demonstrate that cur-
rent statutes do not adequately prohibit indirect involvement with international terrorists and will
propose new legislation.
PROHIBITING INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: CLOSING THE GAP IN
UNITED STATES LAW
INTRODUCTION
The recent prosecution of Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil,
two ex-CIA agents who delivered technical and other forms of
assistance to Colonel Qaddafi of Libya,' has revealed a gap in
1. Edwin P. Wilson, Francis E. Terpil and Douglas M. Schlachter, Sr. were indicted in
the District of Columbia for violations of federal law, including: (1) acting as an agent of a
foreign government without notice; (2) conspiring to transport exlosives in foreign commerce
with intent to use unlawfully; (3) violating the Arms Export Control Act of 1976; (4)
unlawfully transporting hazardous materials in foreign commerce; (5) transporting hazard-
ous materials in foreign commerce with intent to use unlawfully; (6) unlawfully exporting
defense articles on the United States Munitions List and (7) aiding and abetting. They were
also indicted for violations of the law of the District of Columbia. These violations include:
(1) conspiring to commit murder; (2) soliciting to commit murder; and (3) aiding and
abetting. Indictment at 1, United States v. Wilson, No. 80-00,200 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Indictment].
The third count of the indictment charged the defendants with conspiring to export
explosive materials and devices, a violation of the United States criminal code, 18 U.S.C. §§
371, 844(d) (1976). Indictment, supra, at 2. The defendants' involvement in a terrorist
training program was included in count three because the defendants were allegedly instruct-
ing Libyan terrorists in the use of explosive devices and materials. Id. at 4. The indictment
stated that the object of the conspiracy "was to supply covertly and for a profit the Govern-
ment of Libya with personnel, explosives, explosive materials, and other goods necessary to
make explosive devices and to teach others how to make explosive devices in a terrorist
training project." Id. The means allegedly used by the defendants to further the conspiracy
consisted of obtaining thousands of delay devices to construct bombs for use in their terrorist
training project. Id. at 5. The defendants were indicted for recruiting other men to travel to
Libya to manufacture explosive devices and to teach Libyan soldiers how to manufacture
explosive devices in a terrorist training project. Id. at 5-12.
Edwin Wilson is currently a defendant in three other actions. In United States v.
Wilson, Cr. No. 82-139 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-2125 (5th Cir.
Mar. 7, 1983), he is appealing his conviction for exporting plastic explosives and other defense
articles from the United States to Libya. In United States v. Wilson, Cr. No. 82-00,212A
(E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 1982), afJ'd, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at A18, col. 6 (4th Cir. Nov. 7,
1983), Mr. Wilson is appealing his conviction for illegal transportation of fire arms. In United
States v. Wilson, 83 Cr. 0069 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1983), Mr. Wilson was convicted of
attempting to kill witnesses and attorneys involved in these federal trials. N.Y. Times, Oct.
22, 1983, at 28, col. 1.
Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, the President of Libya, "boasts of supporting terrorism
in the Middle East, Europe and Africa." Hersh, The Qaddafi Connection, N.Y. Times, June
14, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 52. Qaddafi hired Wilson and Terpil, whose "accumulated years
of American intelligence agency contacts, experience and expertise" were "a product that
could not be purchased on the open market." Id. See also Taubman, Beyond the Wilson
Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
United States law.2 Current United States statutes do not prohibit
indirect involvement 3 in activities such as the training of terrorists
in guerilla tactics, use of explosives and other warfare, or the re-
cruitihg of United States citizens abroad for participation in terror-
ist activities. 4 Although individuals indirectly supporting interna-
tional terrorism may not actually participate in terrorist attacks,
their indirect support increases the efficacy of the terrorist arsenal. 5
2. The Senate reacted to several newspaper articles reporting on the inadequacy of laws
prohibiting terrorist activities of Americans in Libya. 127 CONG. REC. SII,926-29 (daily ed.
Oct. 22, 1981) (statement of Sen. Glenn). See also Libya's Role in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Near East: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1981) (statement of Frank H. Perez). The
subcommittee chairman, Senator Kassebaum, alluded to the fact that current laws do not
prohibit certain terrorist activities. Id. at 14-15; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as STATE
DEPARTMENT REPORT] (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal).
A State Department report concluded:
[T]he Department of Justice believes that while existing laws are workable, there
are some gaps which should be closed in order to facilitate a better federal investiga-
tive and prosecutive response to the problems caused by international terrorism.
In addition, legislation closely regulating the involvement of United States
citizens and permanent resident aliens in the providing of training and support
services for foreign military and intelligence agencies would be helpful.
Id. at 8.
Pursuant to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No.
97-113, § 719(b), 95 Stat. 1519, 1550 (1981), the President was required to submit this report
which was to include:
(1) a description of all legislation, currently in force, and of all administrative
remedies, presently available, which can be employed to prevent the involvement,
service, or participation by United States citizens in activities in support of interna-
tional terrorism or terrorist leaders; (2) an assessment of the adequacy of such
legislation and remedies, and of the enforcement resources available to carry out,
such measures, to prevent the involvement, service, or participation by United
States citizens in activities in support of international terrorism or terrorist leaders;
and (3) a description of available legislative and administrative alternatives, to-
gether with an assessment of their potential impact and effectiveness, which could
be enacted or employed to put an end to the participation by United States citizens
in activities in support of international terrorism or terrorist leaders.
Id.
3. The State Department defines involvement, service or participation in activities in
support of international terrorism as: "(1) Involvement in actual terrorist attacks; (2) Involve-
ment in a conspiracy to commit such attacks; (3) Providing weapons, training, or other
technical assistance with the likelihood that such assistance will be used in a terrorist attack."
STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
4. See infra notes 21-63 and accompanying text.
5. Federal authorities have accepted the accuracy of testimony that Wilson's and Ter-
pil's sale of expertise to Qaddafi assisted him in the "support of such terrorist groups as the
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Two existing statutes, the Arms Export Control Act, 6 which regu-lates the sale of arms, and one of the Neutrality Laws, 7 whichprohibits military expeditions against a friendly nation, could pro-
scribe some forms qf involvement by United States citizens and
resident aliens in international terrorist activities, but their scope is
limited."
This Note analyzes the legislative history and case law constru-ing the applicable statutes to determine if a court could extend these
statutes to cover indirect involvement of United States citizens and
resident aliens.in international terrorist acts. The Note will demon-
strate that current statutes do not adequately prohibit indirectinvolvement with international terrorists and will propose new
legislation.
I. THE APPLICABLE STATUTES
Several statutes prohibit separate aspects of assistance to inter-
national terrorists. The Export Administration Act regulates the
export of certain technology to terrorist-supporting countries.9 The
Palestine Liberation Organization, the Red Brigades of Italy, the Red Army of Japan, theBaader-Meinhof gang in Germany and the Irish Republican Army." Hersh, supra note 1, at
53.
6. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976).
8. See infra notes 21-63 and accompanying text.
9. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (Supp. III 1979). The Export Administration Act of 1979, 50U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), evolved out of the Export Control Act of1949, ch. 11, § 1, 63 Stat. 7 (1949)(renewed). See H.R. REP. No. 524, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3(1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2705-06. The Act was intended to
affect foreign policy through the use of export controls. Id. at 2706. In 1977, an amendmentto the Act curtailed exports to terrorist-supporting nations. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(8) (Supp. I
1977). The export controls were
to encourage other countries to take immediate steps to prevent the use of theirterritories or resources to aid, encourage, or give sanctuary to those persons involvedin directing, supporting, or participating in acts of international terrorism. To
achieve this objective, the President shall make every reasonable effort to secure the
removal or reduction of such assistance to international terrorists through interna-
tional cooperation and agreement before resorting to the imposition of export
controls.
Id.
Many critics of the export controls argued that the controls endangered United States
economic leverage with foreign countries. See, e.g., Note, Export Controls and the U.S.Effort to Combat International Terrorism, 13 LAW & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 521, 559 (1981)[hereinafter cited as Note, Export Controls]. One of the criticisms was that those "countries
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Logan Act' 0 proscribes correspondence by United States citizens
with foreign governments about controversies with the United
States." The export of arms and munitions of war and "other
who were denied certain U.S. exports often could obtain similar goods from other developed
nations who either did not share U.S. foreign policy goals or were unwilling to sacrifice their
economic interests to achieve those goals." Id. Thus in 1979, when the Export Administration
Act of 1969 was up for renewal, there was strong opposition in Congress to the use of export
controls. See Note, Reconciliation oj Conflicting Goals in the Export Administration Act of
1979-A Delicate Balance, 12 LAW & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 415, 440, 443 (1980). The Export
Administration Act of 1979 sought to balance Congress' interest in deterring international
terrorism with "expanding exports by limiting foreign policy controls on exports." Note,
Export Controls, supra, at 565. The act mandates an elaborate process for approving the use
of the export controls, The President has broad powers to invoke the controls but the act lists
criteria which he must consider before imposing the export controls. 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405(b) (Supp. III 1979). The Department of Commerce determines which items are subject
to the licensing regulations of the statute, id. §§ 2404(c), 2405(k), and the State Department
determines which countries are considered terrorist-supporting. Id. § 2405 (i)(1).
Training of terrorists or other forms of indirect support have never been considered items
subject to the export controls under the various Export Administration Acts. STATE DEPART-
MENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. Although it may be argued that transfering technical
assistance to international terrorists is an export under the regulations of the Export Adminis-
tration Act, the Act has never been imposed to affect indirect assistance. Id. The statute does
not fill the gap in the law because the export controls are only in effect against countries
designated by the State Department as terrorist-supporting. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(i)(1).
Should a court extend the statute to prohibit indirect assistance to international terrorists, it
could only prohibit assistance to those designated as terrorist-supporting nations. Id.
The changes incorporated in the Export Administration Act of 1979 may not have
curtailed exports to terrorist-supporting nations. See H.R. REP. No. 54, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2788. The Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy and Trade held hearings on the threat to United States
national security by the illegal exports of goods and technology. Id. The subcommittee
"reviewed the means employed to circumvent U.S. export controls, such as illegal exports and
reexports, technology smuggling, industrial espionage, exchange programs and conferences,
and foreign exchange programs and conferences, and foreign acquistion of U.S. high technol-
ogy companies, and assessed the adequacy of U.S. resources and efforts to enforce the export
control laws." Id. The testimony evidenced that goods and technology were still leaving the
country illegally, despite the use of export controls. Id.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976).
11. Id. The Logan Act was enacted in 1799, Stat. 613 (1799), and since then has rarely
been invoked. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 89 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
The statute reads:
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of the
United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or
intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, . . . in
relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States ...shall be fined
...or imprisoned . . . or both . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976). The debates in Congress revealed a concern that the power of the
Executive was being usurped and that legislation prohibiting "an interference of individual
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articles" in violation of other laws is also prohibited. 12 The Neutral-
ity Laws prohibit American citizens from enlisting in the service of
citizens in the negotiations of our Executive with foreign Governments" was necessary. 5
ANNALS OF CONG. 2489 (1798) (statement of Mr. Griswold). Several Congressmen were
concerned that the Constitution's provisions prohibiting treason were too narrow in scope.Id. at 2496-98 (statement of Mr. Gallatin). One Congressman criticized the Logan Act on the
ground that "it [was] drawn in the loosest possible manner; and wants that precision and
correctness which ought always to characterize a penal law." Id. at 2638 (statement of Mr.
Gallatin). See also Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp 72, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)(terms such as "defeat" and "measures" are particularly vague).
It is conceivable that the Logan Act has rarely been invoked because of its vague
language. See id. The most recent reference to the Logan Act occurred in the case of Philip
Agee, whose passport was revoked by the State Department in 1980. Agee v. Muskie, 629
F.2d 80, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), discussed
in Note, Passport Revocation: A Critical Analysis of Haig v. Agee and the Policy Test, 5
FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 185 (1981). The State Department alleged that Mr. Agee had violated
the Logan Act by communicating with Iranian militants during the hostage crisis. 629 F.2d
at 112-13. He purportedly suggested to the Iranians that "they should compel the United
States to 'exchange . . .the C.I.A.'s files on its operations in Iran since 1950 for the captive
Americans.' " Id. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court's decision in Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280 (1981), did not discuss the Logan Act violation.
It may be argued that the Logan Act prohibits indirect support of international terror-
ism by United States citizens because such actions "defeat measures" of the United States.
Measures may be defeated when terrorist acts are inflicted against United States allies. The
Logan Act, however, cannot fill the gap in the law because it can only be invoked when a
United States citizen interferes with a dispute or controversy that directly invovles the United
States. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976). Indirect involvement with international terrorists usually does
not include a dispute or controversy directly involving the United States. See supra note 1.
12. 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). This statute controls the illegal export of war materials. Id.
Its violation is often coupled with a violation of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), or the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§
2751-2794 (1976 & Supp. I 1978). See United States v. Marti, 321 F. Supp. 59, 63-64(E.D.N.Y. 1970). Section 401 grants duly appointed persons the power to seize and detain
munitions, war materials or other items which are exported in violation of an exisiting law.
22 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). However, in Marti the statute's application has been limited. 321 F.
Supp. at 59. The defendant in Marti was charged with transporting a stolen necklace in
interstate commerce, and with a violation of the Export Control Act. Id. at 61. The court
stated that "section 401 was primarily directed to limiting the export of war materials in
protection of American neutrality and foreign policy, [though] it has been consistently
applied to other classes of goods." Id. at 63. Other classes of goods have included gold,
automobiles, platinum, jewelry, and watches. United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 835
n.6 (2d Cir. 1980) (stolen telecommunications equipment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111
(1981). Under these interpretations of the statute, indirect assistance in the form of an export
would not appear to be included as an 'other article' or class of goods as those terms are used
in the statute. Cf. id. (indirect assistance exported to international terrorists not similar to
exporting other classes of goods). It is difficult to imagine how one would seize indirect
assistance since it is often intangible. In addition, because indirect assistance to international
terrorists is not a violation of any current law, providing indirect assistance is not a violation
of 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
a foreign government,' 3 accepting a commission to serve a foreign
government, 14 and acting as an agent of a foreign government
within the United Sates.1 5 In addition, the Espionage and Censor-
ship statutel6 prohibits United States citizens from transmitting
information related to the national defense of the United States.1
7
13. Three sections of the United States criminal code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 951, 958-959 (1976),
encompassed in the general category of Neutrality Laws, prohibit certain mercenary activi-
ties. Section 959 states:
Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains
another to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the jurisdiciton of the United
States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state,
colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board any vessel
of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned ....
Id. § 959(a). Indirect involvement is not the equivalent of serving as a soldier, marine or
seaman. Therefore, this statute does not proscribe indirect involvement. It is arguable that in
some instances indirect involvement confers a soldier's status on the individual; however, it
has been held that the word " 'soldier' must be taken in its ordinary sense, as one enlisted to
serve on land in a land army." United States v. Kazinski, 26 F. Cas. 682, 683 (D. Mass. 1855)
(No. 15,508). This section is inapplicable to Wilson's and Terpil's activity because they did
not participate as uniformed members of the Libyan army.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 958 (1976). Section 958 of the Neutrality Laws states: "Any citizen of
the United States who, within the jurisdiction thereof, accepts and exercises a commission to
serve a foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people. . . with whom the United States is at
peace, shall be be fined. . . or imprisoned .... " Id. This statute does not apply to indirect
involvement with terrorists abroad because of the jurisdictional requirement that some overt
act occur irA the United States. Id. The statute also requires that the activity be directed
against a "foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, in war." Id. In many situations,
indirect involvement may occur when a foreign country is not at war. Id.
15. Id. § 951. Section 951 of the Neutrality Laws states: "Whoever, other than a
diplomatic or consular officer or attache, acts in the United States as an agent of a foreign
government without prior notification to the Secretary of State shall be fined ... or impris-
oned. ... Id. Here again there is a jurisdictional requirement that the act proscribed occur
in the United States. In many situations, however, the indirect involvement occurs outside
the United States. Id:
16. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
17. Id. Transmitting information related to United States national defense is a crime
under § 794. That statute provides:
Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or
transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign govern-
ment, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country,
whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States . . . any. . . information
relating to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprison-
ment. . ..
Id.
This statute does not require that the United States be at war but that the information be
advantageous to any foreign country. Id. If the material communicated were considered a
war secret then the individual communicating would be guilty under this statute. See United
1983]
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Two statutes, however, are the most applicable in proscribing di-
rect or indirect assistance: the Arms Export Control Act18 and one
of the Neutrality Lawsl" which proscribes military expeditions
against friendly nations.2 0
A. The Arms Export Control Act
The United States is the world's largest exporter of arms2' and
the Arms Export Control Act embodies a policy of controlling sales
in furtherance of world peace. 22 The statute authorizes the Presi-
dent
to control the import and export of defense articles and defense
services and ... to designate those items which shall be consid-
ered as defense services . . . and to promulgate regulations for
the import and export of such articles and services. The items so
designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List.23
The regulations promulgated under this statute require a li-
cense for importing or exporting an item on the United States
Munitions List.24 One of the items on the list is technical data.2 5 The
States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 204 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953).
However, the transmittal of public information is not prohibited by statute. United States v.
Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946). This statute
would also not prohibit the transmittal of unclassified military information.
18. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1976 & Supp. I 1978).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 48-63.
21. Foreign Assistance Authorization: Hearings on S. 795, S. 854, S. 1816, S. 2662, and
S. Con. Res. 21 Before Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12 (1976).
22. 22 U.S.C. § 2751. The statute states:
As declared by the Congress in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, an ultimate
goal of the United States continues to be a world which is free from the scourge of
war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been
subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a
changing world are achieved peacefully. In furtherance of that goal, it remains the
policy of the United States to encourage regional arms control and disarmament
agreements and to discourage arms races.
Id.
23. Id. § 2778(a)(1). The Munitions List appears at 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1982).
24. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1982). The Munitions List is divided into categories. They
include: (1) firearms; (2) artillery and projectors; (3) ammunitions; (4) launch vehicles,
guided missiles, rockets, torpedoes, bombs, and mines; (5) propellants, explosives, and incen-
diary agents; (6) vessels of war and special naval equipment; (7) tanks and military vehicles;
(8) aircraft, spacecraft, and associated equipment; (9) military training equipment; (10)
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term "technical data" could encompass the provision of various
forms of technical assistance to international terrorists. 26 If this
were the case, transmission of all types of technical assistance with-
out a license would violate the statute. Thus a definition of techni-
cal data would determine which types of technical assistance must
be licensed for export.
In 1976, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Van Hee,27 broadly interpreted technical data to include exporta-
tion of general knowledge about engineering.2 8 One commentator
criticized this decision as interfering with the general interest in the
free flow of information. 29 Scientists in the United States voiced
strong objections because communication of scientific data to their
peers overseas is crucial to their profession.30 They argued that if
technical data were subject to stringent export controls, American
firms and scientists would be hindered in their research and devel-
opment. 31
At the time of the Van Hee conspiracy, 32 the regulation de-
fined technical data as "any professional, scientific, or technical
information relating to arms, ammunition, and implements of war
...which could enable the recipient to use, produce, or operate
...an article on the Munitions List. '33 Based on this definition,
military and space electronics; (11) fire control, range finder, and optical and guidance and
control equipment; (12) nuclear weapons design and test equipment; (13) classified articles;
(14) submersible vessels, oceanographic and associated equipment; and (15) miscellaneous
articles. Id. Miscellaneous articles include "[a]ny article and technical data relating thereto
not enumerated herein having significant military applicability." Id.
25. Technical data is defined in 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1982). See infra text accompanying
note 35.
26. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1982).
27. 531 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976).
28. Id. at 357. In this case, the defendants were convicted of exporting blueprints of an
American designed tank and exporting their engineering experience which they used to
rebuild the tank in Portugal. Id. The defendants used their knowledge of engineering
techniques to ascertain its design and sold that design to the Portuguese government. Id. The
court held that the common engineering technique used to discover the tank's design was
considered technical data because it was useful in illegally reconstructing an item on the
Munitions List. Id. at 356.
29. See Note, Arms Control-State Department Regulation of Exports of Technical
Data Relating to Munitions Held to Encompass General Knowledge and Experience, 9
N.Y.U..J. INT'L L. & POL. 91 (1976).
30. Id. at 105-07.
31. Id.
32. 531 F.2d at 354. The conspiracy transpired in 1965. Id.
33. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1966).
1983]
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the Van Hee court concluded that any information about an item
on the Munitions List was technical data. 34
In 1977, technical data was redefined in the regulations. Tech-
nical data now encompasses:
(a) Any unclassified information that can be used, or be adapted
for use, in the design, production, manufacture, repair, over-
haul, processing, engineering, development, operation, mainte-
nance, or reconstruction of arms, ammunition, and implements
of war on the U.S. Munitions List; or (b) any technology which
advances the state-of-the-art or establishes a new art in an area
of significant military applicability in the United States; or (c)
classified information as defined in § 125.02. 35
Despite the redefinition of technical data, the courts were
again asked to determine the scope of that term. In 1978, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Edler Industries, Inc. ,36 held that technical data must
relate significantly to some item on the Munitions List. 37 The court
held that "Congress intended that the technical data subject to
control would be directly relevant to the production of a specified
article on the Munitions List, not simply vaguely useful for the
manufacture of arms." 38 The court acknowledged that these limita-
tions were necessary to protect the flow of scientific information. 39
34. 531 F.2d at 356. Van Hee argued that engineering experience and know-how were
exempt from the licensing requirements because this type of experience and know-how was
not encompassed by the statute's definition of technical data. Id. The court stated that one
must apply for an exemption prior to exporting the data and that "[elven if the exemption
had been claimed, . . . [it] refers only to unclassified technical data in published form." Id. at
357. "[T]he contributions of these individuals ... consisted of knowledge in the form of
experience and 'know-how' as well as familiarity with widely distributed technical publi-
cations." Id. Van Hee's knowledge and experience were considered by the court to be
technical data because they enabled the Portuguese to use an article on the Munitions List.
Id. at 356.
35. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1982).
36. 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
37. Id. at 521. Edler Industries developed certain materials that had "important appli-
cations for rocket and missile components, particularly in nozzles." Id. at 518. Although these
techniques did not comprise classified information, Edler's application for export licenses was
denied because "exportation of this particular technical knowledge contravened United States
policy." Id. Edler ignored the license denials and implemented a technical assistance program
with a French company. Id. at 518-19. It should be noted that the court in Van Hee stated
that any information on the Munitions List must be licensed for export. 531 F.2d at 356. In
contrast, the Edler court said that the information must relate significantly to an item on the
Munitions List. 579 F.2d at 521.
38. Edler, 579 F.2d at 521.
39. Id.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
The Ninth Circuit's definition of technical data would seem to
prohibit indirect involvement such as instruction of a terrorist in the
use of a weapon on the Munitions List by a United States citizen or
resident alien. 40 Based on the Ninth Circuit decision, indirect in-
volvement, such as recruiting of other United States citizens for
participation in terrorists attacks, or providing general organiza-
tional assistance or training in guerilla tactics to a terrorist group,
does not significantly or directly relate to any item on the Munitions
List. 4' Therefore, a court is precluded from finding a violation of
the statute in these activities.
The statute has another definitional weakness that would hin-
der a court's ability to prohibit export of other assistance. The
statute authorizes the President to designate items which shall be
considered "defense articles" or "defense services."' 42 Those articles
and services comprise the Munitions List. 43 Thus any service item
on the list is considered a defense service, but the term "defense
service" 44 is never defined by the statute or the regulations.
45
If the term "defense service" were defined to include activities
that are associated with instructing and preparing an individual or
group for combat, those forms of indirect involvement that assist in
the preparation for combat would be prohibited by the statute.
However, not all forms of indirect involvement are defense re-
lated. 46
In conclusion, the section concerning the export of technical
data47 is the only part of the statute that could possibly be extended
to prohibit indirect involvement. In addition, the effect of an
amendment to the regulation defining "defense service" would be
limited because the data must refer to acts which are defense re-
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1976).
43. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1982).
44. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1976); 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1982).
45. See supra note 44.
46. Pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751-2794 (1976 & Supp. It
1978), the State Department promulgated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22
C.F.R. § 121.01 (1982) (ITAR), which encompasses the Munitions List. A revision of ITAR is
expected whereby "defense services" will be defined. "The Department of State is now
considering whether the definition should be broadened to encompass the training of foreign
military forces and the participation of U.S. nationals in foreign military activities gener-
ally." STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1976).
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lated. These weaknesses will exist in any statute focusing on arms or
defense.
B. Expedition Against a Friendly Nation-The Neutrality Law
One of the sections of the Neutrality Laws, 48 the Expedition
Against a Friendly Nation Act, 49 makes it a criminal offense for an
individual who, while in the United States, "knowingly begins or
sets foot or provides or prepares a means . . . for, or takes part in,
any military or naval expedition . . . to be carried on from thence
against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state...
or people with whom the United States is at peace." 50 One court
has construed this statute to create two offenses. 51 One is "the...
setting on foot, within the United States, [of] a military expedi-
tion."5 2 The other offense is providing a means for the expedition. 53
The Supreme Court has held that combining and organizing men
and ideas to make war on a foreign government also offends the
statute.
54
The statute may proscribe United States citizens and resident
aliens from indirectly assisting international terrorists when they
make inquiries or participate in sessions in which plans for aiding
international terrorists are initiated in the United States. These
activities could be interpreted as "set[ting] on foot . . .[a] military
... expedition" 55 by furthering a terrorist attack. This statute,
however, still does not fill the gap in the law because there is a
jurisdictional limitation: the prohibited act must occur within the
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 951-970 (1976). The Neutrality Laws proscribe armed attacks which
originate in the United States and are launched against other countries. STATE DEPARTMENT
REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976).
50. Id.
51. United States v. Hart, 78 F. 868, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1897). In Hart, defendant chartered
a boat that was used to transport men and arms to the island of Navassa, with an intent to
invade Cuba. Id. at 872.
52. Id. at 869.
53. Id.
54. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896). Wiborg was convicted of initiating
and preparing the means for a military expedition against Cuba. His activities consisted of
sailing out of Philadelphia, anchoring three or four miles from shore and accepting men and
supplies from another boat, all of which were to be used in an attempt to overthrow the
Cuban government. Id. at 634-35.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976).
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United States. 56 If the indirect furthering of terrorist activity occurs
completely outside the United States, it would not be proscribed by
this statute. 57 In addition, this statute and the cases construing it,
most of which were decided in the late 1800's, do not encompass the
modern concept of terrorism.
58
C. The Inadequacy of the Statutes
The Arms Export Control Act prohibits direct support of inter-
national terrorism by forbidding the illegal export of arms and
technical assistance 59 in the use of those arms. The law prohibiting
military expeditions against friendly governments forbids prepara-
tions from within the United States for setting on foot a military
expedition against a foreign government.60 The statutes are too
rigid to preclude indirect involvement by United States citizens and
resident aliens with international terrorists. Indirect involvement
consists of such activities as training terrorists in guerilla tactics,
recruiting new members or advisors for the terrorist group, organiz-
ing terrorist training camps or lending organizational skills to inter-
national terrorist groups. These activities are not proscribed by the
Arms Export Control Act because they are not sufficiently related
to an item on the Munitions List,61 nor by the Neutrality Law
because the activities do not always constitute expeditions or merce-
nary activity originating from within the United States.6 2 Amend-





58. All cases construing the statute require that acts of setting on foot a military
expedition occur in the United States. See Jacobsen v. United States, 272 F. 399, 400 (7th Cir.
1920) (defendant convicted of inducing resident aliens to join in a plot to initiate a revolt in
India); United States v. Ram Chandra, 254 F. 635, 636-37 (N.D. Cal. 1917) (holding that a
single individual may set on foot a military expedition); United States v. Nunez, 82 F. 599
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896) (defendant convicted for setting on foot a military enterprise against
Spain by fitting a ship for sail from New York in aid of Cuban insurgents); United States v.
Ybanez, 53 F. 536, 537 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1892) (defendant unlawfully began a military
expedition originating in the United States and carried out against Mexico).
59. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1976); 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1982). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 21-46:
60. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 21-46.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 48-63.
63. Section 960 of the Neutrality Laws, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976), prohibiting an expedi-
tion against a friendly nation, originated in 1793 when George Washington proclaimed
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II. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
Due to the spread of international terrorism 64 and because
current law does not proscribe indirect support of international
terrorism," Congress should pass legislation proscribing assistance
to international terrorists. The following is a proposal which pro-
hibits indirect forms of involvement with international terrorists by
a United States citizen or resident alien.
A. Proposed Anti-terrorism Statute
Any United States citizen,66 business entity, 7 or resident
alien 8 within or without the United States, or any alien69 within
the United States, who participates directly or indirectly with
the intention of furthering acts of international terrorism shall
United States neutrality in the war between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, the
United Netherlands and France. 3 ANNALS OF CONe. 1285-86 (1793).
The purpose of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1976 & Supp. II
1978), was geared specifically at tightening the policies and improving Congressional over-
sight with respect to arms sales. Foreign Assistance Authorization: Hearings on S. 795, S. 854,
S. 1816, S. 2662, and S. Con. Res. 21 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1976) (statement of Hon. Gaylord Nelson).
64. For a chronological listing of more than 3000 transnational terrorist events since
1968, see E. MicKoLus, TRANSNATIONAL TERaorusM (1980). One commentator stated:
It is unlikely that international terrorism is a passing and transitory phenomenon.
The trend toward the weakening of central authority in governments, the rise in
ethnic and subnational sentiments, and the increasing fractionalization of the global
political process point toward its growth as a form of political protest and persua-
sion.
Pierre, The Politics of International Terrorism, in CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM 37 (1978).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 21-63.
66. Citizen shall include "any individual owing allegiance to the United States, any
partnership, company, or association composed in whole or in part of such individuals, and
any corporation organized under the laws of the United States, any territory or insular
possession of the United States, any State, or the District or Columbia." H.R. 5211, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (1981) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(e)(1)).
67. Business entity is defined as "any partnership company, or association composed in
whole or in part of citizens of the United States or any corporation organized under the laws
of the United States, any territory or insular possession of the United States, any State, or or
the District of Columbia." Id. § 3(a) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(b)(2)(B)).
68. A resident alien is an individual " 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence,'
[which] means [he has] the status of having been lawfully accorded the privileges of residing
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws,
such status not having changed." Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)
(1976).
69. The term " 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States."
Id. § 1101(a)(3).
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be guilty of a felony and is subject to fine or imprisonment or
both. Participation in acts furthering international terrorism
includes but is not limited to:
(1) conspiring, attempting, soliciting, or recruiting any per-
son or entity to further acts of international terrorism;
(2) conspiring, attempting, soliciting or recruiting any per-
son or entity to conduct or conducting research projects, manu-
facturing projects or construction projects to further acts of in-
ternational terrorism; 70
(3) conspiring, attempting, soliciting or recruiting any per-
son or entity to participate or participating in any form of
combat that furthers acts of international terrorism;
(4) conspiring, attempting, soliciting or recruiting to trans-
mit 71 or transmitting any information that aids, abets, assists,
instructs or directs any individual, group or government in fur-
thering acts of international terrorism.
Affirmative Defenses
It shall be an affirmative defense that any one of these acts:
(1) was in the form of administering medical or surgical
assistance for humanitarian reasons, or
72
(2) was performed in an official capacity authorized by the
United States government. 73
The proposal includes the necessary jurisdictional and defini-
tional considerations. The jurisdictional element of the proposal is
based on two principles of international jurisdiction. 74 When a
70. This section is similar to S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (1982) (proposed
codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(a)(D), (2)(C)), and H.R. 5311, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)
(1981) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(a)(5)).
71. Transmit shall be defined as "something received or obtained through informing:
knowledge communicated by others or obtained from investigation, study or instruction."
WEBSTERs THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2429 (4th ed. 1976).
72. This section is similar to S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (1982) (proposed
codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(a)(j)).
73. This affirmative defense is available to those involved in training foreign soldiers
because such training may involve United States foreign policy.
[E]xceptions to this do not invalidate the definition [of international terrorism], they
simply compel us to recognize that soldiers may sometimes be terrorists. Indeed, a
number of bombing campaigns undertaken by both sides during World War II and
in subsequent wars-for example, the bombing of targets that in themselves had
little military value to the enemy but were struck primarily to punish, to shock, to
cause alarm, and to create disorder among the population of the enemy state.
B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERnoRIsM: A NEW MODE OF CONFLICT 9 (1975).
74. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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United States citizen, while outside the United States, indirectly
supports international terrorism, jurisdiction may be based on the
theory of nationality. 75 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the United States over its absent citizen ... is a
jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of
the laws that are applicable to him and obey them. 76
If an alien indirectly supports international terrorism from
within the United States, jurisdiction may be based on the subjec-
tive territorial principle. 77 This principle "establishes the jurisdic-
tion of the State to prosecute and punish for crime commenced
within the State but completed or consummated abroad. ' 78
An important feature of the proposal is the definition of inter-
national terrorism. 7 No generally accepted definition is now avail-
able. Different individuals might regard the same conduct as an act
of terrorism or patriotism. 80 Terrorism also has different meanings
in different corners of the world, in part because of historical and
political differences distinguishing Western countries from develop-
ing countries. 81 It has been said that "terrorism can only be defined
tautologically as terror and barbarity, or in the words of some,
75. See RESTATEMENT (REvisED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 comments b, c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as DRAFr RESTATEMENT].
The case law supports the principle that the United States can proscribe the conduct of
its citizens outside its borders. In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), the Court
said that "Congress in prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens may project the
impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States." Id. at 282. In
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941), the Court held that international law does not
prohibit a United States court from proscribing conduct of its citizens "upon the high seas or
even in foreign countries." Id. at 73.
76. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932), cited in DRAF' RESTATEMENT,
supra note 75, § 402 reporters' note 1.
77. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435,
484 (Supp. 1935).
78. Id. If an alien commited an act of terrorism in a foreign country, a United States
court would have jurisdiction only if terrorism were deemed a violation of international law.
See Note, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 236,
238-42 (1982).
79. For a discussion of the definition of terrorism, see 1 M. BASSlOUNI & V. NANDA, A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 491 (1973).
80. Wanek, Symposium Summary, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 3 (M. Livingston ed. 1978).
81. See R. CRELINSTEN, D. LABERGE-ALTMEJD & D. SZABO, TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 5 (1978).
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fright intimidation.18 2 The difficulty is also due to the fact that
"terrorism" is a generic term, comprising violence and terror.8 3
Thus, criminologists have yet to agree on a universally acceptable
definition .84
The proposal uses the definition that appears in the Intelli-
gence and Surveillance Act.8 This definition states:
"International terrorism" means activities that (1) involve vio-
lent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a, violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of the government by intimida-
tion or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination
or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national
boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accom-
plished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimi-
date, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek
asylum.88
This definition encompasses the fundamental concepts that consti-
tute87 terrorist activity. A feature of most definitions of terrorism
includes use of violence to intimidate civilians or a government in
order to affect demands made of that government. 8 The definition
also requires that the acts "transcend national boundaries."8 9
82. 1 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, supra note 79, at 491.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (Supp. III 1979).
86. Id.
87. See I M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, supra note 79, at 491, E. MICKOLUS, TRENDS IN
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 45 (1978); SINCH, TERRORISM:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSpEcriVES 7-10 (1978).
88. See Schultz, Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology, in INTERNATIONAL
TERRoRISM 9-11 (1980).
89. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (Supp. III 1979).
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B. Analysis of Congressional Bills
During the 97th Congress, two bills 0 were proposed to amend
the United States criminal code.91 Congress recessed before the bills
could be enacted. Although the Senate and House of Representa-
tives bills were aimed at prohibiting direct and indirect involve-
ment of United States citizens, entities and resident aliens with
international terrorists, the language of the two bills differed.92 The
Senate bill forbade a United States citizen, entity or resident alien
from willfully performing or attempting to "serve in, or [be] in
concert with, the armed forces of any intelligence agency of the
Libyan Government or of any other foreign government, faction,
or terrorist group."' 3 The House of Representatives bill was broader
because it prohibited a United States citizen, entity or resident alien
from serving "in the armed forces of any intelligence agency of, or
in any other military or intelligence capacity for, any such govern-
ment, faction, or group."'9 4 The Senate bill defined intelligence
agency as "any entity which engages in collection, analyzation, and
dissemination of information by, including but not limited to, cov-
ert means."9 5 The Senate bill, unlike the House bill, only prohibited
participation in the "armed forces ... [of] any intelligence
agency"90 and did not prohibit participation in other armed
forces. 7 The Senate bill explicitly provided for extraterritorial juris-
diction for acts that violated the statute." The Senate bill listed
90. Both bills are called the Antiterrorism and Foreign Mercenary Act. S. 2255, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CoNc. REC. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982); H.R. 5211, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981).
91 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-60005 (1976).
92. See S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CoNe. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
1982); H.R. 5211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
93. S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. §
971(a)(1)(A)), 128 CoNe. REC. S2544 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982).
94. H.R. 5211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1981) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. §
971(e) (5)).
95. S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(e)(5)),
128 CONC. REc. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982).
96. Id. § 3(a)(1)(A), 128 CoNe. REc. S2544 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982).
97. H.R. 5211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b) (1981).
98. S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(g)),
128 CONG. REc. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982).
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
several affirmative defenses" and the House bill did not. 00 The bills
differed in some of their definitions as well.'10
Both statutes proposed methods of identifying which groups
may not receive assistance from United States citizens, entities or
resident aliens. 102 The bills granted the President authority to de-
cide which foreign governments, factions or terrorist groups would
be proscribed. 0 3 In effect, if a United States citizen, entity or
resident alien were aiding or supporting a terrorist group which
was not banned by the President, these persons would not be violat-
ing the statute. Another weakness in relying on a list of forbidden
groups or governments is the ease with which such a list could be
circumvented. Assistance could be given to a group that is not on
the list with an intent to re-export to a group that is on the list..
C. Comparison of Congressional Bills with Proposal
The statute proposed in this Note prohibits any act which
furthers international terrorism as defined by the Intelligence and
99. Id. (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(h)).
100. H.R. 5211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1981).
101. For example, the Senate bill defined the term "armed forces" to include "any
regular, irregular, paramilitary, guerrilla, or police force." S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §
3(a) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(e)(2)), 128 CONG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed.
Mar. 22, 1982). The House of Representatives bill defined the term "armed forces" as "any
military entity which is controlled by any foreign government, faction, or international
terrorist group named in a proclamation in effect under subsection (c) of this section includ-
ing any regular, irregular, paramilitary, guerrilla or police force." H.R. 5211, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3(a) (1981) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(e)(4)). In comparison, the
Senate bill defined "intelligence agency" as "any entity which engages in collection, analyza-
tion, and dissemination of information by, including but not limited to, covert means." S.
2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §3(a) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(e)(5)), 128 CONG.
REC. S2244-45 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982). The House of Representatives bill defined the term
"intelligence agency" as "any entity which is controlled by any foreign government, faction,
or international terrorist group named in a proclamation in effect under such subsection and
performs any intelligence function." H.R. 5211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1981) (proposed
codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(e)(5)).
102. S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. §
971(c)(1)), 128 CONG. REC. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982); H.R. 5211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3(a) (1981) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(c)(1)).
103. S. 2255, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. §
971(c)(1)), 128 CONG. REc. S2544 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982); H.R. 5211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§3(d) (1981) (proposed codification at 18 U.S.C. § 971(c)(1)).
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Surveillance Act.10 4 Unlike the Congressional bills, this proposal
does not depend on the government's accuracy in listing interna-
tional terrorist groups that pose a danger to the United States
national security or commerce. Under the Congressional proposals,
several terrorist attacks could occur before the President identified
which terrorist group was responsible. Thus, any United States
citizen, entity or resident alien involved in acts of international
terrorism would not be acting illegally if the President had yet to
proclaim the responsible terrorist group as a danger to United States
national security or commerce.
The proposal recognizes a need to support certain legitimate
activities abroad that may resemble acts of terrorism. If any person
is involved in an officially sanctioned act that resembles interna-
tional terrorism, that person has an affirmative defense. Two prob-
lems created by use of this affirmative defense are the endangering
of national security and interference with the conduct of foreign
policy through in court revelation of sensitive United States opera-
tions. However, the need to combat acts of terrorism outweighs the
need to give absolute protection to United States support of acts
that resemble terrorism.1 05
The last section of the proposal prohibits use of information to
directly or indirectly aid, abet, assist, instruct or direct acts that
further international terrorism. The Congressional bills did not
have such a "catch all" section. This section is helpful because it
gives the statute flexibility and prohibits assistance that is not as
tangible as recruiting pilots to fly for a terrorist group or training
terrorists in guerilla warfare. It also guards against forms of assist-
ance that have yet to evolve.
III. COUNTERVAILING ARGUMENTS
By proscribing indirect support of international terrorism, the
proposal limits the right to transmit information from one country
to another. Such a limitation may conflict both with international
agreements that encourage the exchange of scientific data and with
the first amendment rights of free speech and association. The
104. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (Supp. III 1979).
105. For example, the United States has been accused of financing groups fighting to
overthrow the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1983, at A12, col.
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following sections address the problems posed by international and
constitutional law in enacting the proposal.
A. International Law
International law does not at this time prohibit indirect sup-
port of international terrorism. 10 International law encourages the
flow of scientific and technical data when it is used in a peaceful
manner.10 7 At the Helsinki Summit, 108 thirty-three countries were
party to an agreement that encourages "making information more
widely available to scientists and research workers." 00 The summit
also promoted a free flow of "oral information in the form of
lectures and printed information in the form of newspapers and
other publications, and in the forms of broadcast." 1' 0 The United
States has also entered into bilateral treaties with many nations that
encourage nationals of either country "to gather and to transmit
material for dissemination to the public abroad.""'
Some forms of terrorism are addressed by multilateral treaties
outlawing "acts of terrorism taking the forms of crimes that are of
international significance.""12  Under other international agree-
ments, including the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Sei-
zure of Aircraft" 3 and the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons," 4 the
106. See infra text accompanying notes 107-16.
107. See generally Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navagation, Apr. 2, 1953,
United States-Japan, art. I, para. 2, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2066, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter
cited as Japan Treaty]. A provision in this treaty providing for the the free flow of informa-
tion between the two countries is similar to provisions in the other 46 friendship, commerce
and navigation treaties entered into between the United States and other nations. See
Commercial Treaty Index, A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. (Supp. 1976).




111. Japan Treaty, supra note 107, art. 1, para. 2(d).
112. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons and Related Extortion that are of Interna-
tional Signficance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413, 10 I.L.M. 255 (1971).
See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons and Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 13 I.L.M. 41 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Protected
Persons].
113. Convention For Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
114. Convention on Protected Persons, supra note 112.
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United States extends jurisdiction when the offender is found in the
United States. 115 This is done in a spirit of international cooperation
with a hope of deterring international terrorist activities.,, Al-
though these agreements proscribe terrorist activity, they do not
address the transnational flow of information that contributes to
acts of international terrorism.
There may be a consensus that indirect support of terrorism in
the form of transmitting assistance is a violation of international
law if the recipients are considered international bandits or pi-
rates. 117 However, this problem has not been specifically addressed
in an international agreement. Crimes of international terrorism
have not been defined or proscribed on the basis of indirect support
of terrorist groups but rather emphasize direct terrorist attacks." 8
International law mirrors the concern of United States laws for
the free flow of information."l 9 The flow of scientific or technical
information is important to the friendship and cooperation of na-
tions, and is encouraged by many treaties. 12 0 Several multilateral
treaties, however, also proscribe acts of terrorism. A balance must,
therefore, be reached between the obligation to counter interna-
tional terrorism and the need to foster the international exchange of
scientific information. The statute proposed in this Note meets this
requirement in that it only forbids the exchange of information
which demonstrably furthers international terrorism.
B. Constitutional Issues
Regardless of the purposes for which information is transmit-
ted domestically or internationally, the first amendment' 2' protec-
tion of speech must be considered. Opponents of the proposal may
argue that it impinges on the right of a United States citizen or
resident alien to freedom of speech 22 and freedom of association.12 3
115. See supra notes 113-14.
116. See Convention on Protected Persons, supra note 112, preamble.
117. See DrtAr RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 404.
118. See B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A NEW MODE OF CONFLICT 10 (1975).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 27-39.
120. Id.




Despite the absolute language of the first amendment, situa-
tions arise when freedom of speech and freedom of association are
not protected. 124 For example, copyright laws' 25 impinge on free-
dom of speech because the first amendment does not include the
right to appropriate the speech of others.' 26 The limits of the first
amendment's absolute protection of freedom of speech were not
significantly tested until Schenck v. United States.'2 7 According to
Justice Holmes, the test to be used when attempting to proscribe
speech is "whether the words are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.' 2 8 Prohibiting speech and association which will in all
likelihood result in violence would be considered one of the evils
against which Congress may legislate. 2 Since Schenck, the "clear
and present danger" test has been reshaped by the Supreme
Court. 30 Two tests are used by the Supreme Court13 ' to determine
whether speech which advocates criminal conduct is not constitu-
tionally protected by the first amendment. In Brandenburg v.
Ohio,' 32 the Court enunciated one of two standards for determining
124. Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger: " From Schenck to Brandenburg-
and Beyond, in FE SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION 302 (P. Kurland ed. 1975).
125. United States Copyright Laws, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-1810 (1976).
126. One commentator stated that:
[T]he most important objective that underlies freedom of speech [is] the mainte-
nance of the democratic dialogue. . . also known as the market place of ideas ...
It is important that we have free access to . . . [many] ideas, . . . [but exposure to
different ideas] does not require the freedom to reproduce those ideas without
permission. . . . To reproduce [another person's] ideas may add flavor, but little
substance [to the market place of ideas]. Such minimal substance, . . . is far out
balanced by the public benefit that accrues through copyright encouragement of
creativity.
1 M. NIMMEE, COPYRIGHT §1.10(B) (1982).
127. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The defendant was convicted of causing insubordination in the
United States armed forces by distributing a document that encouraged the insubordination.
Id. at 49.
128. Id. at 52.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See Strong, supra note 124, at 302.
132. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The defendant was acquitted from charges that he advocated
"the duty necessity and propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform." Id. at 444-45. The
defendant's actions consisted of participating in a Ku Klux Klan rally with 11 other members
on a farm in Ohio. A group of newsmen recorded the event and it was established that the
defendant had disparaged Blacks and Jews. Id. at 445-46.
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which types of speech are not constitutionally protected. Under
Brandenburg, the speech must incite a crowd with intent to pro-
duce violence; there must be a likelihood of violence ensuing and
the likelihood must be imminent.133 The other test was set forth in
Dennis v. United States.134 A broad test was introduced by Judge
Learned Hand in the Second Circuit opinion and, in the same case,
it was adopted by the Supreme Court. 13 This test is whether the
"gravity of the evil, discounted by the improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 13 This
statement was clarified in Yates v. United States137 where the Court
interpreted Dennis to require that the government establish not
mere "advocacy of abstract doctrine," but "advocacy directed at
promoting unlawful action."'' 3 8 Thus, if teaching and advocating
violence to a group of people would reasonably incur a threat of
violence, this teaching and advocating would not be constitution-
ally protected. 13
Although some commentators consider the Brandenburg test
more proper, 140 in 1977 the Supreme Court used the "gravity of the
evil" test in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. "4 The case in-
volved an order issued by a Nebraska state court judge enjoining the
press from reporting about the suspect in a celebrated murder
case. 4 2 The order was a form of prior restraint, "the most serious
and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment Rights."'' 43
133. Id. at 447.
134. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (defendant convicted for conspiring to advocate a violent
overthrow of the United States government and to organize a Communist party to teach
necessity of such action).
135. 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
136. 341 U.S. at 515.
137. 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (14 defendants tried for conspiring to advocate a violent
overthrow of the United States government and to organize a Communist party to teach
necessity of such action).
138. Id. at 318.
139. Id. at 321. For a discussion of the cases and principles involved in the "clear and
present danger" test after Dennis, see Antieau, Dennis v. United States-Precedent, Principle
or Perversion?, 5 VANO. L. REV. 141 (1952); Gorfinkel & Mack, Dennis v. United States and
the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 475 (1951); Lusk, The Present Status
of the "Clear and Present Danger Test"-A Brief History and Some Observations, 45 Ky. L.J.
576 (1957); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L.
REv. 313 (1952).
140. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 740 (1978).
141. 427 U.S. 539 (1977).
142. Id. at 542-44.
143. Id. at 559.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
The Court did not use the Brandenburg test because the restraint
did not involve speech tending to incite imminent lawless action. 
144
A statute providing subsequent punishment to those individ-
uals indirectly assisting and supporting international terrorists does
not involve speech intended to incite individuals to imminent law-
less action. Rather this conduct advances the likelihood of violence
through, for example, the instruction of terrorists in guerilla war-
fare, the assistance to terrorists in building arms factories, or the
provision to terrorists of sophisticated weapons systems.
45
To determine whether this activity is considered an evil that
outweighs the grant of first amendment protections, the term "evil"
must be given some parameters. In both Dennis 148 and Yates, 47 the
the "evil" conduct consisted of individuals carrying out a plan to
overthrow the United States government. In Nebraska Press Associ-
ation,148 the evil which the court order sought to avoid was the
damaging effect of newspaper accounts on a murder suspect's op-
portunity to receive a fair trial. 49 Although indirect assistance to
international terrorists does not necessarily present a danger to
United States security or threaten an individual's opportunity to a
fair trial,150 it encourages international violence and instability.
Under international treaties, the United States has an obligation to
combat international terrorism.151 Furthermore, United States citi-
zens and United States property are often the targets of interna-
tional terrorists.15 2 Because the United States government has an
obligation and an interest in protecting its citizens and property,
those individuals who indirectly assist international terrorists
should not be granted first amendment protections. The fact that
not all acts of international terrorism target United States interests
144. See id. at 542-44.
145. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
146. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
147. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
148. 427 U.S. 539 (1977).
149. Id. at 542-44.
150. The issue in both Dennis and Yates was first amendment freedom of speech. In
Nebraska Press Ass'n, the conflict between the first amendment right of free speech and the
sixth amendment right to a fair trial was at issue. 427 U.S. 539 (1977).
151. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
152. A recent example is the terrorist bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut,
Lebanon. N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1983, at Al, col. 4.
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is inconsequential because international instability engendered by
international terrorism may affect United States interests indirectly.
Of the two tests, the Dennis test is more applicable. This test
would not protect indirect assistance to international terrorists be-
cause this conduct is evil and the likelihood of violence ensuing is
great. 1 53 The Brandenburg test is not applicable here because the
speech is not intended to incite a group to imminent lawless ac-
tion.15 4 As stated by commentators of constitutional law:
[T]he Court has yet to face the most troublesome question under
this [Brandenburg] test. Should the Court confront a situation
where a speaker advocates violence through the use of ...
speech which does not literally advocate action, . . .the major-
ity might be urged to look for proximity to violence rather than
to the literal words of incitement. 55
Since the Court has not been called upon to decide whether speech
that is a catalyst to international terrorism and violence should be
granted first amendment protection, Dennis provides the most use-
ful test for determining whether such activity should be constitu-
tionally protected. Indirect assistance to international terrorists in-
creases the likelihood of violence under the Dennis test and its
proximity to violence has been demonstrated by the Wilson case.156
CONCLUSION
Presently, it is not illegal to train someone in methods of
killing. 57 It is illegal, however, to export weapons without a li-
cense15 8 or to "set on foot a military expedition against a friendly
nation."'15 The gray area of indirect assistance to international
terrorists, however, is not prohibited by any United States statute.
Opponents of legislation criminalizing the transmission of informa-
153. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
154. The Brandenburg test has been applied to "regulatory schemes that determine
eligibility for public employment and moral fitness justifying disbarment." Communist Party
v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 447 (1974). See J. BARON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE
SpEEcn AND FREE Pas 24-31 (1979).
155. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 140, at 740.
156. See supra note I and accompanying text.
157. For example, learning to shoot a gun or training in martial arts is not illegal when
there is no intent to kill or hurt a specific person.
158. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1976 & Supp. 111978); 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1982).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976).
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
tion for use by international terrorists might argue that these acts
are not criminal because there is no intent to use the information to
hurt or kill a specific individual or group. 160 Although terrorism
eludes a universally accepted definition,'"' the methods and goals of
many terrorist groups are similar. The essence of all forms of terror-
ism is the use of violence and intimidation. 2 It should be irrelevant
that the individual transmitting assistance to terrorists does not do
so with an intent to injure or murder a specific individual or group.
Rendering assistance to terrorists should not go unpunished merely
because the ultimate victims are not identifiable. There being no
international or constitutional roadblocks to a new statute, indirect
assistance to international terrorists warrants prohibition.
Dawna M. Cobb
160. See STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 2.
161. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
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